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It is claimed in the many papers that a trace distance (d) guarantees the universal composition
security in quantum key distribution (QKD). In this introduction paper, at first, it is explicitly
explained what is the main misconception in the claim of the unconditional security for QKD
theory. In general terms, the cause of the misunderstanding on the security claim is the Lemma
in the paper of Renner. It suggests that the generation of the perfect random key is assured by
the probability (1 − d), and its failure probability is d. Thus, it concludes that the generated key
provides the perfect random key sequence when the protocol suceeds. So the QKD provides perfect
secrecy to the one time pad. This is the reason for the composition claim. However, the quantity
of the trace distance (or variational distance) is not the probability for such an event. If d is not
small enough, always the generated key sequence is not uniform. Now one needs the reconstruction
of the evaluation of the trace distance if one wants to use it. One should first go back to the
indistinguishability theory in the computational complexity based, and to clarify the meaning of the
value of the variational distance. In addition, the same analysis for the information theoretic case
is necessary. The recent serial papers by H.P.Yuen have given the answer on such questions. In this
paper, we show more concise description of Yuen’s theory, and clarify that the recent upper bound
theories for the trace distance by Tomamichel et al and Hayashi et al are constructed based on the
reasoning of Renner and it is unsuitable as the analysis for information theoretic security. Finally,
we introduce a macroscopic quantum communication with different principle to replace Q-bit QKD.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information science holds enormous promise
for entirely new kinds of computing and communications,
including important problems that are intractable using
conventional digital technology. The most expected field
is quantum cryptography. But realizing that promise will
depend on theoretical guarantee of the security and the
ability to transfer an extremely fragile quantum condi-
tion. Here we would like to point out that, in general,
scientists are not familiar with practical applications in
the real world. QKD is an example of the stern realities
of the field.
Despite enormous progress in theoretical quantum key
distribution, many theory groups are still discussing the
security proof for QKD [1,2]. Recently, M.Tomamichel et
al announced that in any practical implementation, the
generated key length is limited by the available resources,
and the present security proofs are not established rigor-
ously in such a situation [3]. It means that ”asymptotic
resource assumption” cannot be met by practical real-
ization. Such a statement is welcome to acomplish the
development of the real secure communication technol-
ogy.
However, without the review of the incompleteness
of the theory, it is repeatedly and persistently claimed
that a specific trace distance criterion would guarantee
universal composition security in quantum key dis-
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tribution. So far several criticism on such theory of
QKD have been presented [4,5]. Unfortunately, almost
all the theory group on QKD ignored these criticism.
This is disagreeable in the development of science and
technology. Researchers are obliged to clarify ”what
is going on” in the discussion of the scientific theory.
At present, there is no review paper on such a dispute.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a story of
the argument on the recent theory of QKD and the
criticism against them. In the section 2, we introduce
the Shannon theory on the cryptography to confirm the
basis of the concept of the information theoretic security.
In the section 3, we introduce the fundamental concept
of the current security theory of QKD by R.Renner [1].
In the section 4, we provide an evidence on which there
is no theoretical proof of the unconditional security for
any QKD, despite that many theoretical papers claimed
the perfect proof of the unconditional security based on
the Renner’s concept. That is, we confirm the following
statement:
One cannot ensure the information theoretic secu-
rity of QKD only by the concept such as ǫ-security.
One needs to spell out the operational significance of the
definition.
In the section 5, we give the outline of the Yuen’s
criticism. In the section 6, we explain the unsuitable
performance of Q-bit quantum communication like
QKD. In the section 7, we show why Q-bit quantum
communication should be replaced by macroscopic
quantum communications, and explain the macroscopic
2quantum effect of coherent state which is useful to apply
it to secure communications.
II. THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR
PHYSICIST AND MATHEMATICIAN
In order to simplify the description, we treat a stream
cipher that is the representative encryption method in
the conventional cryptography. The transmitter and the
receiver so called Alice and Bob share the pseudo random
number generator(PRNG) with a short secret key KS .
The information bit sequence X as the data is scrambled
by XOR operation of the data bit and the output bit of
the PRNG at the transmitter. The bit sequence of the
output of the XOR operation is called ciphertext Y.
Y = X⊕KR (1)
Bob receives the ciphertext and he operates again XOR
to the ciphertext by own output bit sequence from
PRNG. Finally he can obtain the information bit se-
quence from such operations.
Here we describe the fundamental symbols as follows:
KS is secret key, |KS | is bit number of the secret key or
key length, KR is the running key, |KR| is bit number of
the running key or running key length. The role of the
PRNG is to extend the secret key length, keeping a good
randomness. For example, let as assume |KS | =256 bits.
The secret key is extended by appropriate PRNG to
|KS | = 256⇒ |KR| = 2256 − 1 (2)
This corresponds to the running key. Thus, 2256 − 1 bits
data can be encrypted only by 256 bits secret key.
The secret key has to be generated from the physical
random phenomena, because 256 bit should have uniform
randomness. It corresponds that the estimation probabil-
ity of the secret key before the encrypted communication
is
Psuc(KS) = 2
−256 ∼ 10−66 (3)
When the encryption system satisfies the above condi-
tion, the security analysis goes to the search of the de-
cryption algorithm. The important parameters for such
an analysis are the complexity of the structure of PRNG
and the length of ciphertext that Eve uses to determine
the secret key. In principle, it is decrypted when Eve gets
the known plaintext (information data) of 256 bits and
the corresponding 256 bits ciphertext by so called brute
force attack. But its calculation number:N that Eve has
to try is
N = 2256 ∼ 1066 (4)
Let us assume that Eve has the billion super computers.
She may need more than million years to determine the
secret key of 256 bits. Thus, it has no trouble in the real
world application. The main problem in such a mathe-
matical cipher is that nobody can deny the existence of
the algorithm to determine the secret key from the in-
formation of the structure of PRNG when Eve can get
very long ciphertext or known plaintext. This is denoted
such that the security level of the system does not rule
out drastic breach of security.
Only one way to avoid such situation is to employ the
one time pad stream cipher. It means that the running
key sequence from PRNG is replaced by physical random
sequence. Shannon provided the theory of the security
for the one time pad as follows:
Definition 1(Shannon, 1949 [6])
The perfect secrecy or full information theoretic security
is defined as follows:
P (X|Y) = P (X) ∀Y (5)
where X is plaintext and Y is ciphertext, respectively.
This is sometimes called unconditionally secure stream
cipher. But this terminology is not adequate in the
real world, because it is liable to cause misunderstanding.
Theorem 1(Shannon, 1949 [6])
The perfect secrecy in the one time pad is attained when
the following conditions are satisfied:
|KS | = |KR| ≥ |X| (6)
Psuc(KS) = 2
−|KS| = 2−|KR| (7)
The first condition means that the secret key and the
information bit must have the same length. The second
condition means the perfect uniformity of the secret key.
Also it corresponds to the estimation probability for the
secret key before the secret communication. That is, the
secret key must be generated from the physical complete
random phenomena.
For example, when the key length is 10,000 bits, the
estimation probability is as follows:
Psuc(KS) = 2
−10,000 ∼ 10−3,000 (8)
In the real application, several Tera bits random se-
quence generated from the physical phenomena is stored
in the Hard Disk and it is carried by the air plane et
al. Thus, its system may provide the perfect uniformity
and the potential of the perfect secrecy. There is a
big question. Can one realize the key distribution by
communications which can provides the perfect secrecy?
A quantum key distribution QKD was suggested in
order to give a solution for such a realization problem.
The problem is that whether such QKD can provide the
perfect uniform key sequence or not.
3III. FORMULATION OF QKD THEORY BY
R.RENNER
There is a long story on the security analysis of the
quantum key distribution, and the theory has very com-
plicated structure. But here we give concise description.
A. Definition of Security
The claim that the generated key sequence provides
the perfect secrecy is made on behalf of the trace
distance criterion:d as follows [1]:
Definition 2
The trace distance is defined as follows:
d ≡ 1
2
||ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ||1 (9)
When
d ≤ ǫ (10)
the generated key is called ”ǫ-security”. Some times, it
is called unconditional security, if ǫ is small enough.
Renner and his group claim that the generation of
the perfect random key is given by the probability
(1 − d), and it failure probability is d. If one has the
upper bound of d as ǫ, the probabilities for the success
and failure are (1- ǫ) and ǫ, respectively. Thus, they
claim that the generated key sequence is always true
uniform random bit sequence whenever the protocol well
succeeds. This is justified by the following reasoning.
B. Reasoning of the Interpretation
The community of QKD employs the following varia-
tional distance formulation to give the reasoning. In the
classical cryptography, the security is evaluated by the
variational distance.
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| ≤ ǫ (11)
Such a theory is called indistinguishability theory.
Therein, the attacker’s ability is limited to the polyno-
mial computational power or resource. Under this as-
sumption, one evaluates how much precisely the attacker
can distinguish two random systems. The upper bound
is related with the algorithm.
On the other hand, in the case of information theo-
retic case, the attacker has unbounded computational
resource. So under such a case, the upper bound of
the variational distance must be evaluated. Renner
first discussed the classical case and gave the following
Lemma.
(Lemma of Renner [1])
Let P and Q be two probability distributions. Then
there exists a joint probability distribution PXX′ , such
that PX = P , PX′ = Q, and
Pr[x 6= x′] = δ(P,Q), PXX′ → (x, x′) (12)
Renner deduced the following statement from the above.
(Statement)
The variational distance between P and Q can be inter-
preted as the probability that two random experiments
described by P and Q , respectively, are different. It can
apply to the quantum case.
This leads a great misconception in the security
analysis for QKD.
IV. WHAT IS WRONG IN QKD THEORY?
A. Fundamental Concept
The statement in the above section is derived from the
Lemma of Renner that asserts the existence of a joint
distribution which gives marginal distributions P and Q
and for which the results of the two random experiments
differ with just probabilities δ(P,Q).
H.P.Yuen has repeatedly claimed that this does not
imply the Renner interpretation of δ which is the basis
of his d interpretation [5,8,9]. The ǫ is not an event
probability though it may be the difference of two event
probabilities, and the variational distance is not the
probability that information is leaked. More important
fact to deny the interpretation of Renner is as follows
[4,5]:
Lemma 1
When d is not zero, the generated key sequence is not
uniform.
That is, one cannot claim the uniformness of the
generated key sequence based on the Renner’s concept.
Thus, the interpretation of ǫ employed by the whole
community of QKD such as ”failure or success” prob-
ability of the protocol is wrong. This fact gives very
serious effect to the theory of the upper bound for the
trace distance. We show an example in the next section.
B. Misconception of Upper Bound Theory of the
Trace Distance
Here we describe the concrete misconception on the
trace distance and its upper bound. The trace distance
is a measure for the nearness between density operators
4or probability distributions. It may be bounded by
several theoretical functions. For example, d is clearly
bounded by Holevo quantity as follows:
Theorem 2 [7]
The trace distance is bounded by the Holevo quantity χ
as follows:
2d2 ≤ χ (13)
where
χ = S(ρE)− < S(ρKE ) >K (14)
Furthermore, there are many options of the upper
bound. One can accept such a formulation. But the
main problem is to evaluate the quantitative feature of
the upper bound. However, the unsuitable method has
been employed.
Here we would like to clarify what is the problem.
They misunderstood the conception of the cryptography
based on the indistinguishability theory as denoted in
the section 3, and under such concept they invented
several methods to give the upper bound. Renner gave
a quantum generalization of the classical Leftover Hash
Lemma, and it may give a theoretical justification of
the role of the privacy amplification. Then his group
made a theory of smooth mini entropy and so on to give
a numerical property of the upper bound of the trace
distance. That is, they confirmed that the trace distance
provides a kind of failure probability of the protocol.
Hence, if they can estimate the above parameters related
with the failure probability of the protocol, they can
think that it gives the upper bound of the trace distance.
In 2009, Cai and Scarani [10] tried to calculate the
the upper bound based on smooth mini entropy and pri-
vacy amplification, and Scarani simplified its explanation
[11]. They explicitly described in their paper [10] such
that the ǫ has the operational meaning: it represents the
maximum probability of failure that is tolerated on the
key extraction protocol. The value of ǫ (the upper bound
of d) is assumed without any reason. Then, they con-
structed the upper bound theory based on the concept of
the failure probability and related parameters. Thus, we
can clearly see that these come from the fact that they
employ Renner’s concept.
Yuen showed that the concept of the estimation
probability on key is an essential to ensure the security
in his serial papers [4,5,8,9]. Then, in 2011, Tomamichel
et al [3] gave the statement as follows:
(Statement)
Despite enormous progress in theoretical QKD, the se-
curity of the present scheme is not established rigorously.
So they changed own theory such that the upper
bound of the trace distance is given by a function ∆ of
the smooth mini entropy.
∆ = min
ǫ′
1
2
√
2l−H
ǫ′
min
(K|Y ) + ǫ′ (15)
where the smooth mini entropy has an operational mean-
ing from the quantum leftover Hash lemma such that it
is related with Eve’s estimation probability of the key
sequence. Despite their effort, their function ∆ and the
trace distance d are compulsorily connected as follows:
d ≤ ∆ (16)
(1 − pabort)∆ ≤ ǫ (17)
where pabort is the probability for aborting the protocol.
Then ǫ is given as ”given security level” without any rea-
son. They assume ǫ = 10−10 as the typical value. If it is
a failure probability, it is sufficient value. Consequently,
it seems that they still keep in mind the concept of
the failure probability from the above equations. Thus,
they go back to a concept of ”failure”. Since the trace
distance does not mean the failure, they cannot ensure
the security.
Contrarily Hayashi-Tsurumaru keep the original way,
and give the following direct method to evaluate the up-
per bound of the trace distance [12]. They define that
ǫ is the parameter related with probability of the error
in the estimation of the phase error rate from sample
bits. In their paper, ǫ =
√
ǫHS is regarded as the upper
confidence limit of the phase error as follows:
Pr{c|pˆshift(c) ≥ pshift(k, c)} > 1− ǫHS ∀k (18)
where c is error bits in sample, k is error bits in the to-
tal bit, pshift(k, c) is phase error rate of shifted key, and
pˆshift(c) is estimation of phase error rate of the shifted
key, respectively. Then they introduce the statistical fluc-
tuation to proceed the logic. They employ the normal
distribution function to treat the statistical fluctuation
in the estimation of the phase error rate as follows.
Φ(s(ǫHT )) =
∫ ∞
s
1√
2
exp(−x2/2)dx (19)
ǫHS = Φ(s(ǫHT )) (20)
When ǫHS = ǫ
2 is given, s(ǫHT ) is derived.
Finally they show that the bound is given by the decod-
ing error probability in the phase error correction code.
Of course they give the relation between estimation error
of phase error rate and the decoding error based on the
estimation error. Consequently, the upper bound of the
trace distance is given by the decoding error probability
Pphase of phase error correction.
d ≤
√
2
√
P phase (21)
5Thus, their upper bound theory seeks parameters of fail-
ure or abort of the protocol. So, their bound is effective
when and only when the interpretation of the trace dis-
tance is related with the Renner’s concept. In fact, their
numerical example clearly shows their concept. That is,
also they just assume
ǫHS = 4× 10−26 → s(ǫHS) = 10.5 (22)
Consequently the upper bound of the trace distance is
d ≤ 10−10 (23)
Again if this means the failure probability, it make a
sense, but it is too large for the uniformness evaluation as
shown in the next section. Thus, they keep the concept of
the failure in mind when they construct the upper bound
theory for the trace distance.
One can invent many theories of the upper bound.
Even if these can bound the trace distance, they can-
not guarantee the security because of their misconcep-
tion. That is, we emphasize that one cannot guarantee
the information theoretic security of QKD only by
ǫ− security : d ≤ ǫ (24)
Remark
ǫ-security provides the relative evaluation for protocl,
but it does not provide the absolute evaluation as the
cryptographic matter.
The community of QKD avoids the discussion of the
real issue of the cryptography, and they insist as if the
ǫ-security provides unconditional security or information
theoretic security in the real application.
V. KEY ESTIMATION ATTACK FOR QKD
A. Basis
In the previous section, we have explained the in-
completeness of the security theory of the QKD. In
order to improve the situation, here we introduce the
reformulation of the trace distance which unifies the
indistinguishability and the Shannon’s definition of the
perfect secrecy. In the unified theory by H.P.Yuen, the
most important attack is the estimation attack against
the non uniform key. According to the lemma 1, the
generated key sequence in QKD is, in general, not
uniform. So Eve will try to estimate the generated key
sequence based on her any quantum measurement to
photon streams that carry the raw key. This key esti-
mation attack for QKD is formulated by the estimation
probability on the key generation process. Let YE be
the random bit sequence as the result of her quantum
measurements. The success probability of estimation
of the key sequence is denoted as P (KG|YE) based on
quantum detection theory.
Definition 3
If the success probability of estimation of the key
sequence KG is
P (KG|YE) ∼ 2−|KG| ∀YE (25)
then the system is information theoretically secure and
it has composablilty.
In the above definition, one needs the perfect uni-
form distribution of key sequence in QKD protocol to
attain the secrecy. This definition is natural according
to the Shannon’s concept on the information theoretic
security, and the generated key provides the perfect
secure one time pad.
As the next step, one needs to evaluate the upper
bound of the success probability to guarantee the
security. Fortunately, the success probability of key
estimation can be related with the trace distance.
Theorem 3 [8,9]
Let us assume d ≤ ǫ. The upper bound of the averaged
success probability is given by
< P (KG|YE) >≤ ǫ+ 2−|KG| (26)
The bound Eq(26) can be achieved after (26) with equal-
ity. The meaning is as follows: The upper bound of the
success probability is evaluated by the trace distance or
its upper bound. In general, in order to give the bounds
for P (KG|YE), one needs full information on error cor-
rection code and privacy amplification scheme.
B. Example
Although the upper bound theories by Renner group
and Hayashi group are not appropriate to evaluate the
trace distance, we here employ it, and let us see what is
happen.
In general, they give a bound of d as the average over
the privacy amplification. So we put it as follows:
d ≡< dPA >≤ ǫ = 10−10 (27)
From the corollary,
< P (KG|YE) >≤ 10−10 (28)
When the length of the generated key is |KG| = 104, the
security requirement of the key estimation probability is
10−3000 from Eq(25). So 10−10 is excessively large and it
does not work as the security guarantee. That is,
10−3000 << 10−10 (29)
6In addition, one should apply the Markov inequality to
obtain an individual privacy amplification guarantee.
This converts the averaged one to an individual one.
Theorem 4 [8,9]
Let us assume < dPA >≤ ǫ. From two times application
of Markov inequality, one gets
P (KG|YE) ≤ ǫ1/3 + 2−|KG| (30)
When we use the result Eq(27), we have at worst
case as follows:
P (KG|YE) ≤ 10−3.3 (31)
If one requires 10−3,000 in Eqs(19,20), clearly these do
not work. Thus, even if we consider any favorable treat-
ment of the present QKD theory, it comes to grief as the
security guarantee.
C. Proper Security Evaluation of QKD
The real guarantee of the security of QKD is to show
that it is comparable to that of a uniform key. In the
above section we explained that the upper bound theo-
ries of the trace distance by the current researchers do not
provide the requirement of the unconditional security. If
the upper bound of the trace distance is evaluated cor-
rectly, it may have a meaning in the security analysis.
But the present theory only gives the value of Eq(32).
We show such a situation in the Table-1.
/ Present QKD Requirement
Key estimation 10−3.3 10−3,000
TABLE I: Key estimation probability evaluation for the
present theory and its requirement for the unconditional se-
curity
VI. NON EFFICACY OF Q-BIT QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION
Recently, some program administrators of science and
technology became aware of the non efficacy of Q-bit
communication in the practical use, and they have pro-
posed ”macroscopic quantum communication”. In this
section, we introduce a reason.
A. Poor Communication Performance
Let us explain the mismatch between the communica-
tion performance of QKD and the real communications.
The optical communications based on bright coherent
states routinely achieve unsecured communications rates
exceeding 1010 bits per second (10 Gbit/sec) over dis-
tances exceeding 10,000 Km. For the data center commu-
nication, it provides 1011 bits per second (100 Gbit/sec)
by the wavelength division multiple system as shown in
the table-II
In general, to realize such a performance, one needs
the average photon number per pulse at the transmitter
as follows:
< n >= 106 (photon/pulse) (32)
The primary purpose of quantum communication was
to devise a method for the protection of information car-
ried by such a high speed communication with the above
large signal energy. That is, a role of physical encryption
is to protect such a high capacity optical communication
based on physical phenomena. So the encryption scheme
has to have also high speed performance.
/ Data speed Distance
Basic system 10 Gbit/sec 10,000 Km
Data center 100 Gbit/sec (WDM) 1,000 Km
TABLE II: Performance of Conventional Optical Communica-
tion, and Target of Secure Quantum Communication without
Relay Station.
The communities of quantum information made a story
that Q-bit quantum communications are, in principle,
capable of providing a provably secure communications
channel, and that communications protected by quan-
tum security can typically only be attacked ”in transit”
and are not vulnerable to off-line attacks at some point in
the future using newly developed techniques or computa-
tional resources. A solution for the above purpose of the
community was the quantum key distribution by Q-bit
communication. To protect the data, they employed one
time pad based on the key sequence generated by QKD.
This is called hybrid cipher.
Let us consider the performance of the present hybrid
cipher consisting of QKD and one time pad. In QKD
process, Q-bit signals such as single photon have proven
extremely fragile in the face of loss and noise, effectively
limiting the range of quantum communications to 103
bit per second (Kbit/sec) at a range of 100 Km. So the
data encryption speed is the same as that of QKD. This
corresponds to the communication in the Stone Age.
/ Data speed Distance
Basic system 1 Kbit/sec 100 Km
WDM system 10 Kbit/sec (WDM) 100 Km
TABLE III: The communication performance of QKD. There
is the strong trade-off between speed and distance.
Such a limit of the performance is verified by the
fundamental physical law of communication which is
7called quantum communication theory. Thus, there is no
method to improve the efficiency of the communication
if one employs Q-bit with such strong quantum effect as
signals.
The real world is asking the secure optical communica-
tion by means of physical encryption for communications
as shown in the Tale II. If one uses one time pad, the
speed of QKD has to be the same as the data speed of
the conventional optical communication. But, there is no
possibility of realization of such a performance by QKD.
If the security technology for the low speed communi-
cation is a target, one does not need a new technology
to protect the data, and it can be done by means of a
hybrid cipher of one time pad and Hard Disk (random
bit sequence) carried by bike. Thus, the role of quan-
tum communication should be to provide the secure high
capacity optical communication.
B. Trick of Key Rate Theory
If one wants to realize the real requirement, one has to
realize QKD system over 109 bit per sec (1 Gbit/sec) as
the signal transmission speed, because one needs one time
pad for 1 Gbit/sec. If one uses the generated key as the
secret key for the conventional mathematical cipher such
as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), the security of
the total system is the same as the mathematical cipher
such as AES.
Any theoretical group knows such a problem, but no-
body confesses such a defect of Q-bit communication.
Their interest was devoted only to the bit per symbol rate
of the key generation. However, in all papers, they ignore
the energy loss effect to evaluate the key rate. The rate
is evaluated by the received photon sequence, not trans-
mitted photon. In the conventional communication, the
almost all signals arrive at the receiver, so one can evalu-
ate the rate by the received signal sequence. In the Q-bit
quantum communication, if the transmission distance is
100 Km, the energy loss is 20 dB, so already the rate
becomes about 0.01. Although many papers claimed the
Shannon limit for the coding et al, these do not make a
sense in the practice.
If one wants to provide the system applicable to the
real world, the important unit is bit per second, not bit
per symbol.
C. Quantum Repeater for QKD
The devices that create Bell pairs over a distance are
called ”quantum repeater”, building on the concept of
teleportation. In general, the form of the repeater con-
sists of the purification and swapping. Bell pairs are con-
sumed during the course of teleportation, purification,
and entanglement swapping. Thus, the primary job of
a repeater is to continually produce new ones. There is
no doubt that the concept of the quantum repeater is a
great idea in the quantum information science. However,
although one can enjoy the terminology of the informa-
tion science in quantum physics, one cannot easily con-
nect it with the information science for the real world.
The reason is the same as QKD itself. The real efficiency
suffers the energy loss. Finally the speed of the repeater
system becomes extremely slow. For example, for the
transmission of 1,000 Km, when the present QKD and
the repeater system are employed, the signal transmis-
sion speed is
R = 10−1 (bit/sec) (33)
This means that one has to wait over 30 years to share
109 bits (1 Gbit).
D. No Security Guarantee of Real System
As we discussed in the sections 4 and 5, the quantum
key distribution protocol has no security guarantee even
in the theoretical model at present. In addition, almost
all experiments do not show the quantitative security pa-
rameter, despite that they claim unconditionally secure.
This is unusual.
If they wants to quantify the security of the concrete
protocol, they need to employ the estimation probabil-
ity on key, providing the concrete error correction code
and privacy amplification code. So, they have to aban-
don an indirect parameter such as ǫ-security which is not
accepted in the real application. It works only for math-
ematical interest.
Since the improvement of the communication perfor-
mance and the security cannot be expected by the phys-
ical law of the communication, these technologies should
be limited to a model for the physics experiment in uni-
versities to study the principle of quantum theory.
VII. MACROSCOPIC QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION
In this section, we explain a research program of tech-
nology which can overcome the defect of Q-bit quantum
communications.
A. Basic Concept
The present information security is algorithmic, and
as a result, not provably secure. Crypto-systems of
algorithmic security include pseudo random number gen-
eration and public key encryption. The security of these
algorithmic techniques is based on the assumption that
certain mathematical problems are effectively impossible
to solve using contemporary computer resources and
well-known attacks. However, this type of security is in-
principle vulnerable to off-line attacks. If the data speed
8is not so high as the present wireless communication, the
present information security technology can protect the
data or secret key against any enemy. However, in the
current optical communication, the data speed is over
100 Gbit/sec, and any present scheme cannot encrypt
such data with provable security. So we should inquire a
new technology to cope with the above problem.
The physical direct encryption is a candidate for such
a purpose. In order to accomplish such problems, one
needs to develop macroscopic quantum communications.
In 1990, we established the international conference on
quantum communication, measurement and computing
(so called QCMC) in order to discuss a potential of
macroscopic quantum communications.
Our group is developing innovative research in the
area of macroscopic quantum communications (proposals
which can combine the security of quantum communica-
tions with the distances/rates of macroscopic telecommu-
nications). This research provides innovative approaches
that enable great advances in secure quantum communi-
cations.
The primary goal of our program is to demonstrate
that quantum communications can communicate infor-
mation data at sustainable rates of 1 Gbit/sec to 100
Gbps at distances of 1,000 Km. Our program also has
goals as follows.
(1): To demonstrate that secure quantum commu-
nications can be extended to entirely new domains, such
as sea and space.
(2): Since one time pad is meaningless in the modern
communication, we extend quantum communications
beyond key distribution to other practical, scalable
quantum protocols.
(3): One should use purely classical means of encoding
bright coherent states with encrypted information
(e.g., using classical phase or amplitude modulation, or
relying on pseudo-random algorithms), but its security
performance must be protected by ” full quantum
effect”.
(4): It is not allowed to extend the distance of
communications using relay stations in between the
transmitter and the destination, except for intermediate
optical amplifiers.
We denote that utilizing entanglement is not planned,
because of its extremely fragile in the face of loss and
noise. It cannot realize the requirement from the real
communication performance such as 10 Gbit/sec over
1000 Km, because of physical law of the communication.
Our programs include plans for a laboratory-scale
testbed capable of conclusively demonstrating this scal-
ability using the fiber cable system in our university. All
elements necessary for continuous operation at the speed
of data and distances above can be addressed, with pro-
totypes of each key technology delivered to the testbed.
Our plan produces prototypes and deliver them to a cen-
tral testbed in the collaboration with the cable compa-
nies.
B. Macroscopic Quantum Effect
The technologies which could be critical include:
high-rate deterministic sources of single photons and
entangled photons. High-rate single-photon detection is
useless for the real communications, because the system
must clearly demonstrate how each of the following
rate/distance will be achieved:
(1):Direct data encryption over 10 Gbit/sec, not
key distribution, not one time pad.
(2):Communication at 1∼10 Gbit/sec over 1,000∼10,000
Km without the stations.
(3):The use of the cryogenic cooling is not allowed.
The quantum communications including Q-bit are
highly sensitive to loss and leads difficult situation on
realization of the requirement.
Question arises: what quantum effect is useful to realize
the above requirement ?.
Let us consider the uncertainty principle as the most
important quantum phenomena. The uncertainty
principle has two structures:
(i) Kennard-Robertson indeterministic principle
(ii) Heisenberg uncertainty relation
The latter is used in the QKD to evaluate the distur-
bance by Eve. This is a typical example of the micro-
scopic quantum effect. But the former does not imply
the microscopic, it is also effective in the macroscopic
region. A typical example is non orthogonal quantum
states in optical modes like coherent state or squeezed
state. The coherent state is the minimum uncertainty
state for two conjugate observable like quadratic ampli-
tude of light field that implies the Kennard-Robertson in-
deterministic principle [13]. Also it cannot be cloned with
the fidelity 1 according to the nocloning theorem [14].
On the other hand, if one measures certain observable
of light wave with coherent state, one suffers quantum
noise effect. Consequently, one cannot discriminate in-
formation signals carried by coherent state without error
according to the state indistinguishability theorem
[15]. The above quantum effects are observed not only in
the case of weak signal but also in the case of strong sig-
nal. For example, let us assume two coherent amplitudes
α1, α2 of the coherent states, and δ = |α1 − α2| << 1,
9and |α1| >> 1, |α2| >> 1. The ultimate error in quan-
tum detection is [15]
Perror =
1
2
[1−
√
1− exp(−|δ|2)] ∼ 1
2
(34)
Strong laser lights with very close amplitude cannot be
distinguished by the quantum effect. Also these cannot
be cloned. If the attacker suffers such an effect in commu-
nication process, we can use this quantum principle for
the secure communication [16] [17]. Thus coherent state
is applicable to such concept, because coherent state is
the most robust against any decoherence in optical chan-
nels, and it has macroscopic quantum effect.
Here we can conclude that the key technology in
quantum information science is to manipulate the
macroscopic quantum effect that forces bad effect to the
attacker, but allows the classical optical communication
to the legitimate users. It is a kind of wire tap channel
as follows:
(1):The channel of Alice - Bob = Conventional optical
communication performance over 10 Gbit/sec.
(2):The channel of Alice - Eve = Quantum com-
munication performance based on several quantum
theorems.
/ Feature Latency
Channel of Alice - Bob Classical No
Channel of Alice - Eve Quantum effect /
TABLE IV: A Scheme of Macroscopic Secure Quantum Com-
munication required by the Ministry of Defense
A channel of Alice - Bob transmits the binary coherent
states |α(1) > or |α(1) >, but two signals are randomized
by a mathematical method, and it can be decrypted by
the secret key. A channel of Alice - Eve, for example, is
described as follows:
Let us assume that the discrimination among quan-
tum states at the output of the channel is described by
POVM.
ΠEj ≥ 0,
∑
ΠEj = I, (35)
where I is an unit operator, i and j are 1, 2, . . .M . Then a
conditional probability for each trial of the measurement
is given by
P (j|i) = TrρiΠEj . (36)
where
ρi = |αi >< αi| (37)
By the mathematical randomization, the signal states be-
come mixed state, but the probability is caused by the
mathematical scheme.
The minimization problem of the average error prob-
ability based on the above equation is called quantum
detection theory, which is a fundamental formalism in
quantum information science. If the average error prob-
ability is given by
Pe = min
Π
{1−
∑
piTrρiΠ
E
i } ∼ 1−
1
M
(38)
This performance is completely determined by full quan-
tum nature. And Eve cannot obtain any information.
Although Eve can extend her measurement to the collec-
tive quantum decision making scheme, one can design to
protect such attack.
Thus, the channel of Alice- Bob looks like a classical
one which can provide high capacity communication such
as 1 Gbit/sec to 100 Gbit/sec, but the channel of Alice -
Eve who wants to get the information is blocked by the
quantum effect. The summary is shown in the table-IV.
C. Initial Shared Key Problem
In physical cryptography, there is no possibility to
share the key sequence without the initial shared key as
shown in the table V.
/ Initial shared Purpose Security
BB84 |Ks| > 256 bits Authentication Intrusion detection
New |Ks| = 256 bits Seed of PRNG Quantum noise hide
TABLE V: A role of the initial share key. In BB84, the secu-
rity for the ket extension process has to be guaranteed. In a
new one, the seed key and running key from PRNG have to
be hidden by quantum effect.
Here we can say that the glamorization of QKD faded
when the proof of the necessity of initial shared key was
given. That is, nobody can start the protocol for key
distribution without the initial secret key, and it is a re-
treat of the function for the requirement from the real
world. If the initial shared key is unavoidable, it is valu-
able that researchers of Quantum Information Science
consider how to control the quantum effect by means of
PRNG as the quantum symmetric key encryption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a theory that the claim of the
strong security on quantum key distribution is incorrect.
From the simple explanation, we believe that one could
understand what is wrong in the theory of QKD. Al-
though the trace distance plays an important role in the
security analysis, it is not sufficient to guarantee the in-
formation theoretic security. The role of the quantum
key distribution is to provide the secret key sequence for
the symmetric key cipher including one time pad. So the
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quantitative evaluation against the key estimation attack
is necessary, according to the Shannon’s original idea on
information theoretic security. Thus, the current theory
of QKD does not work at all, and a development of the
evaluation theory of the key estimation based on quan-
tum detection theory is necessary.
Even if the theoretical issue is solved, one has serious
problem. That is, Q-bit quantum communication to real-
ize QKD is useless for the commercial system because the
communication performance is excessively poor. To put
it simply, the key distribution by Hard Disk may work
well and it provides the unconditional security which is
stronger than QKD. Thus, we should develop macro-
scopic quantum communications for the real application
of quantum information science to the secure communi-
cation. This should be done urgently, otherwise quantum
technology cannot contribute to the current high capac-
ity network with 100 Gbit/sec data transmission which
is promptly asking the ultimate security.
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Appendix
A. Response to the paper
We have several response on this paper as follows:
1. Science Daily: Quantum cryptography theory has a
demonstrated security defect.
(http://www.sciencedaily.com/)
2. Help Net Security: Quantum cryptography theory
has a proven security defect.
(http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=13383)
3. Asia Pacific Security Magazine: Quantum cryptogra-
phy theoru has a proven security defect.
(http://www.asiapacificsecuritymagazine.com/)
4. Global security magazine:Quantum cryptography
theoru has a proven security defect.
(http://www.globalsecuritymag.com/)
5. Nanotechnology Now: Quantum cryptography theoru
has a proven security defect.
(http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi?storyid=45724).
6. Infosecurity magazine:Quantum cryptography theoru
has a proven security defect.
(http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/)
7.Quantum.com:Study proves Incompleteness and limit
of security theory in quantum cryptography.
(http://www.azoquantum.com/news.aspx?newsID=76)
8.Communications for automation: Defect found in
quantum cryptography.
(http://www.isssource.com/)
9. US Department of Homeland Security: Daily Report
August 8, 2012, p-17.
10. North DAKOTA Homeland Security:August 8, p-19.
11. NATO-Computer incident response capability
(GNS):Cyber Newsletter, No-29, p-7, August 10, 2012.
B. Interview and Comments
1. German Newspaper, Die Zeit-Zeit Online:
How secure is quantum cryptography, really?
August 17, 2012. http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/
2012-08/quantenkryptographie
H.P.Yuen, O.Hirota, and R.Renner.
2. German Newspaper, Die Zeit-Zeit Online:
Physicist versus Cryptographers,
August 17, 2012. http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/
2012-08/quantenkryptographie/seite-2
H.P.Yuen, O.Hirota
3. Cryptographer (Associate professor in Brazil)
It seems to me that they found evidence that QKD bits
are not uniformly distributed, invalidating unconditional
security.
4. Cryptographer (Professor in Germany)
So far, the definition of the security was unsubstantial,
but now clear.
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